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Abstract This paper explores how a conception of the rule of law (embodied in a
variety of legal and political institutions) came to affirm itself in the world of the
ancient Greek city states. It argues that such a conception, formulated in opposition
to the arbitrary rule of man, was to a large extent consistent with modern ideas of
the rule of law as a constraint to political power, and to their Fullerian requirements
of formal legality, as well as to requirements of due process. The article then
analyses how this ideal was formulated in the Archaic period, and how it became a
key feature of Greek identity. Finally, it argues that in the fifth and fourth centuries
BCE it came to be used as the measure of the legitimacy of Greek political systems:
democracy and oligarchy, as they engaged in an ideological battle, were judged as
legitimate (and desirable) or illegitimate (and undesirable) on the basis of their
conformity with a shared ideal of the rule of law. Then as now, to quote Tamanaha,
‘the rule of law’ was ‘an accepted measure worldwide of government legitimacy’.
Keywords Ancient Greece · Athens · Democracy · Oligarchy · Tyranny
1 Introduction
The starting point of Tamanaha’s (2004, p. 3) much cited book-length study on the
rule of law is the recognition that ‘the rule of law is an accepted measure worldwide
of government legitimacy’. He remarks on the ‘global endorsement’ of the rule of
law, far beyond any ‘other single political ideal’. This global endorsement of the
concept goes hand in hand with the belief that the rule of law produces a variety of
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social and economic goods, from human welfare to political stability and economic
growth, and is therefore the key precondition for the development of a just and
prosperous society.1 And, because of this, scholars and governmental agencies alike
use a variety of aggregate measures to test whether this or that state conforms to
(some of) the conditions of the rule of law. Møller and Skaaning (2014) provide an
extensive discussion of the many different (and occasionally incompatible) concepts
of the rule of law presupposed by such aggregate measures, and attempt to bring
some conceptual clarity to the field. But, regardless of the conceptual sophistication
(or lack thereof) of these measures and debates, the bottom line is that, to return to
Tamanaha, ‘[t]he rule of law is a major source of legitimation for governments in
the modern world. A government that abides by the rule of law is seen as good and
worthy of respect’—the rule of law (however it is measured and conceptualized) is
held as the measure by which the legitimacy of a state, government or constitution
should be judged.2
Tamanaha, in the same context, also observes that ‘[u]nanimity in support of the rule
of law is a feat unparalleled in history’. The emergence of such a notion (and of the
related institutions) has been explained by investigating a distinctive and (for some)
historically unique historical process arching back toWestern and Central Europe in the
MiddleAges.3 The argument is oftenmade that the rule of law as itmanifests itself in the
modernpolitical traditions of theWest has emergedout of a distinctive historical process
the roots of which are to be found in the Middle Ages. Yet claims that the end results of
such a development—ideas (and institutions) of the rule of law as opposed to the rule of
man that entail, at the very least, Fullerian notions of formal legality and the requirement
that government officials are limited in their actions by the law (whatever thedefinitional
disagreements)—are in anywayunique, immediately sound problematic to the historian
of ancient Greek law, politics and political thought. One needs only to turn to Aristotle,
who in the fourth centuryBCE, in thePolitics, reports the following as anopinionwidely
held (and that he himself holds with some qualification):
[S]omepeople think that it is not according tonature for oneperson tohave authority
over all the citizens, where the city-state is established out of similar persons. For
personswhoare similar bynature necessarily have the same right and the samemerit
according to nature. […]Consequently, it is just to rule nomore than to be ruled, and
it is just [to rule and be ruled] by turns. But this is already law; for law is the order
[taxis] [by which offices are shared]. Hence the rule of law is preferable to that of a
single citizen. (Arist. Pol. 1287a10–14, 16–20; trans. Miller)4
1 Similar considerations are the starting point also of the Møller’s article in this same issue. Cf. Belton
(2005: 5), Carothers (2006), Haggard et al. (2008), Møller and Skaaning (2014).
2 Tamanaha (2012: 232): ‘the notion of the rule of law is perhaps the most powerful and often repeated
political ideal in contemporary global discourse. Everyone, it seems, is for the rule of law. The rule of law
is a major source of legitimation for governments in the modern world.’
3 E.g. Tamanaha (2004: 15–31), Jones (2008), Blaydes and Chaney (2013), Fukuyama (2011, 2014). See
Møller in this issue for a sophisticated reconstruction of the historical process that, from the Middle Ages,
has led to the modern notion (and institutions) of the rule of law.
4 For a comprehensive and accessible discussions of Aristotle’s ideas on law and the rule of law see
Miller (2007) and Bertelli (2018). All the abbreviations used for the works of ancient Greek authors are
those of the Oxford Classical Dictionary.
M. Canevaro
123
That this is indeed a widely-held notion is confirmed even by a summary look at the
speeches of the Attic orators, where we find a huge number of passages with variations
on the same theme. One example among hundreds—in 322 BCE Hyperides declares:
There cannot be complete happiness without independence. Formen to be happy
theymust be ruled by the voice of law, not the threats of aman; freemenmust not
be frightened by accusation, only by proof of guilt; and the safety of our citizens
must not depend on men who flatter their masters and slander our citizens but on
our confidence in the law. (Hyp. Epit. 25; tr. Cooper).
If we move outside Athens, to the very Panhellenic contingent of the Greek
expedition to Asia narrated by Xenophon in his Anabasis, we find the same
notions at play. In book 5 (5.7-8) the mercenary army of the Ten Thousand,
composed by Greeks from all parts of Greece, sees discipline starting to break
down, to the extent that one of the agoranomoi (an official) is attacked by the
mob of the soldiers. The agoranomos flees, and Xenophon reproaches the
soldiers for their behaviour, and for threatening to kill a man without trial. As a
result, the assembly (agora) of the soldiers votes that anyone who instigates
such behaviour in the future will be put to death after a trial; that the generals
will bring the accused to trial; that the company commanders will be the judges;
that the generals themselves will be put to trial for their conduct (and some of
them are fined for various offences). Xenophon himself is accused of hybris and
defends himself in a trial. The incident is evidence that there was widespread
agreement among the Greeks that officials should behave in accordance with the
laws, and be tried if they do not, but at the same time that everyone has a right
to due process, and no one should be put to death without trial. The soldiers in
the expedition came from many different Greek communities—Athens, Boeotia,
Stymphalus Sparta, Thessaly, Achaea, Olynthus and Arcadia—yet they all
recognized these basic principles.5
Such passages clearly show that a notion of the rule of law as opposed to the
rule of man (and to anarchy) was widely understood and endorsed in the world of
the Greek poleis, and that it entailed curtailing the arbitrary power of government
and officials and securing due process for the accused whose guilt had to be
proven in accordance with the law.6 These notions are not only found in the
reflections of philosophers and orators, and in the narratives of the historians, but
are enshrined in the official oaths of the city. The Athenian Ephebic oath, an oath
that young Athenians citizens eighteen years of age pronounced on entering
Ephebic service (something in-between military training and civic education), had
them swear:
I shall be obedient to whoever exercise power reasonably on any occasion and
to the laws currently in force and any reasonably put into force in future. If
5 On the Anabasis as a reflection on communities and their success and decay (into lawlessness) see
Dillery (1995: 59–98), Howland (2000), Nussbaum (1967), Dalby (1992), Hornblower (2004). For recent
discussions of this episode see Grethlein (2012: 28–30), O’Connor (2016).
6 For the centrality of the notion of the rule of law as opposed to the rule of man in modern conceptions
see Tamanaha (2012: 243–246).
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anyone destroys these I shall not give them allegiance both as far as is in my
own power and in union with all (tr. Rhodes and Osborne).7
Even more significant in this respect is the Judicial Oath, sworn in Athens at the
beginning of each year by the 6000 Athenians citizens selected by lottery to serve as
judges in the popular lawcourts for the year—a document for the expectations of the
Athenians about the role of their lawcourts, and for the values that underpinned
these institutions. We find 137 references to this oath in the speeches of the orators
pronounced during trials in the lawcourts,8 and from these references we can
reconstruct four pledges:
1. to vote in accordance with the laws and the decrees of the Athenians (e.g.
Aeschin. 3.6; Antiph. 5.8; Dem. 20.118);
2. to listen to both parties equally (Aeschin. 2.1; Dem. 18.2; Isoc. 15.21);
3. to vote (or judge) in accordance with the best legal argument (dikaiotate gnome)
about matters for which there are no laws (i.e. the letter of the statutes is
ambiguous) and without favour or hostility (e.g. Dem. 23.96; 57.63);
4. to vote about matters pertaining to the charge (Aeschin. 1.154; Dem. 45.50; cf.
Aeschin. 1.170).
These four pledges, together, give a rather precise idea of what the Athenians
expected from the judges. The first pledge, by far the most widely quoted in the
orators, binds the judges to decide cases on the basis of the laws—their job was to
assess whether the facts of the case matched the operative facts illustrated by the
relevant law, and only in that case to inflict the normative consequences prescribed
by the law.9 The second pledge expresses a commitment to providing both parties
with an equal hearing and equal opportunities. The third pledge binds the judges not
to take into account enmity and extra-legal matters, and provides guidance in those
cases in which the letter of a statute is not conclusive in guiding their decision: the
judges must in these cases vote honestly and side with the party that offers the best
legal argument.10 The fourth pledge is connected to the second and is key in that it
7 The oath is preserved in a fourth-century inscription from the deme of Acharnae (RO 88), and in
slightly modernised versions in Poll. 8.105-6a and Stob. 43.48. For good discussions of the oath see
Siewert (1972, 1977), Rhodes and Osborne (2003: 440–449), Sommerstein and Bayliss (2012: 13–22).
8 See Harris (2013: 351–356) for a list of the occurrences. A text purporting to be the actual oath is
preserved at Dem. 24.149–51, but it is a pastiche composed by a later forger on the basis of quotes in the
orators and of some guesswork, see Canevaro (2013: 173–180) (Sommerstein and Bayliss 2012: 69–80
are marginally more optimistic on the reliability of some of its clauses, but ultimately agree that it is a
later pastiche).
9 The terminology here is that of MacCormick (2004: 12–77). For laws often (but not always) formulated
in casuistic form in the ancient Greek world see Carey (1998) and Harris (2013: 12–77).
10 The interpretation of the gnome dikaiotate (found only in four passages of the orators: Dem. 20.118,
39.39-40, 23.96-97, 57.63; see also Arist. Pol. 1287a26) has been the focus of much disagreement among
scholars. Some scholars (e.g. Todd 1993: 54; Christ 1998: 201–203; Too 2008: 107; Lanni 2006: 72;
Forsdyke (2018) read this reference as providing a separate, alternative standard of judgement (justice as
an alternative to the laws). But gnome dikaiotate comes into play only when ‘there are no laws’ (cf. Harris
2013: 104–105 and Sommerstein and Bayliss 2012: 76–77, pace Mirhady 2007). It is not an alternative
standard of judgement that excludes the laws—the authority of the laws is paramount, and the gnome
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shows that legal procedures were designed to guarantee a fair trial and equal
opportunities to both parties. It effectively bound the judges to vote exclusively on
the charge, and not on separate matters and on the basis of other considerations.11
Athenian conceptions were not limited to notions of the rule of law as opposed to
that of man, of the need to curtail the power of officials, and of securing due process.
They created further requirements that are consistent with Fullerian notions of
formal legality.12 Fuller identified as key requirements of the rule of law: (1)
generality of laws; (2) promulgation; (3) no retroactive laws; (4) clarity of laws; (5)
no contradictions in the laws; (6) laws do not require the impossible; (7) relative
constancy of laws through time; (8) congruence between official action and declared
rule. We have discussed the requirements of the Judicial Oath, which bind the
judges to pass judgements in accordance with the existing laws, as well as notions of
the accountability of officials under the law (see also below). These features match
Fuller’s requirement of congruence between official action and declared rule (8).
The Athenians at the end of the fifth-century, following oligarchic coups and
revolutions, enacted rules that defined clearly what the requirements were for
enacting a law,13 and these rules match further requirements of the Fullerian notion
of formal legality. These laws are discussed by Andocides (1.85-9). One of them
states that ‘it is not allowed for magistrates to use an unwritten (agraphos) nomos
not even about a single matter’. This is a basic rule to be respected in the city:
magistrates should perform their task adhering strictly to the instructions of the
written laws, and not according to customs, or to any principle that is not enshrined
in the laws of the city. This law matches Fuller’s requirement for congruence
between official action and declared rule (8). Another law preserved in Andocides
states that ‘no decree, neither of the Council nor of the Assembly, is to have more
authority than a law’. This law for the first time introduces a clear-cut distinction
between nomoi and psephismata, and a hierarchy between the two, with nomoi
(laws) being rules of a higher level, which can overrule decrees but cannot be
overruled by them.14 Because of this law, decisions of the Assembly or of the
Council cannot contradict the existing laws, and a certain level of clarity and
coherence of the laws is guaranteed. This matches Fuller’s requirements (4) and (5).
Footnote 10 continued
dikaiotate of the judges comes into play only when the guidance offered by the laws is less than
unequivocal (cf. Harris 2013: 104–114; Sommerstein and Bayliss 2012: 76–77; see Pelloso (2018) for the
meaning ‘the best legal argument’). Note also that references to the gnome dikaiotate appear only four
times in almost one hundred speeches of the Attic orators, and in all cases they do not introduce
arguments that contradict the written law, see MacDowell (2009: 76 n. 48) and Harris (2013: 104–105).
11 See Harris (2013: 114–136) and Thu¨r (2008: 66–69). For accessible accounts of Athenian legal
procedure and legal argument along the lines sketched here, see Canevaro (2018a, b).
12 Fuller (1969: 39). Cf. the very similar accounts of Raz (1979: 14–18) and Finnis (1980: 170–171), and
the discussions of various minimalist (as well as thicker and substantive) definitions provided e.g. in
Tamanaha (2004: 91–113) and Møller-Skaaning (2014: 13–27).
13 For an account of this process, and of its roots in the earlier nomothetic tradition as well as in
democratic developments, see Canevaro (2015), with previous bibliography. The content of these rules
matches quite nicely the idea of ‘rules of recognition’ discussed in Hart (1994: 94).
14 Two pioneering essays by Hansen (1978, 1979) have demonstrated that the Athenians throughout the
fourth century respected this subdivision and this hierarchy carefully. Cf. Canevaro (2015).
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The next law quoted by Andocides states (although in negative terms) that laws
(nomoi) must be general in their formulation (Fuller’s requirement [1]): ‘It is not
permitted to enact a law directed against an individual unless the same law applies
to all Athenians’.15 The Athenians defined what a nomos was by forbidding laws for
single individuals: laws must have a general content and apply to all Athenians
alike. Another law that is likely to belong to the same context is the law of Diocles,
which states that any new law is to be valid from the day of its enactment (unless the
law itself provides for a later starting point).16 Thus this law provides that laws
cannot be retroactive, which matches Fuller’s requirement that there should be no
retroactive laws (3). These rules were complemented by the creation, in the same
context, of comprehensive legislative procedures—rules of change—whose purpose
was to secure the coherence (Fuller’s requirement [5]) and the clarity (Fuller’s
requirement [4]) of the laws of the city, while at the same time guaranteeing their
stability (Fuller’s requirement [7]).17 These rules also required that law proposals
should be posted and publicised extensively, and all Athenian laws were freely
accessible in the public archives as well as, often, as inscriptions in public places
(Fuller’s requirement [2]: promulgation). Formal legality was explicitly understood
as functional to legal certainty—in Demosthenes’ words:
Opposing laws are repealed so that there is one law for each subject. This
avoids confusion for private individuals, who would be at a disadvantage in
comparison to people who are familiar with all the laws. The aim is to make
points of law the same for all to read as well as simple and clear to understand.
(Dem. 20.93; tr. Harris)
The evidence I have presented so far should suffice to show that the Athenians (and,
according to Aristotle, the Greeks more generally) were aware of a concept of the
rule of law that is recognizable to us, and consistent with many of the features that
we normally attribute to the rule of law. It also shows that they enshrined it in their
legal institutions, in the relevant rules as well as in oaths and in the rhetorical
commentary to the workings of these institutions. It would be misleading however
to suggest that Greek historians unanimously accept that the Athenians consistently
achieved and practiced the rule of law—this is one area in which the last thirty years
have seen a heated debate. While some scholars, Edward Harris in particular, as
well as (with different approaches and nuances) Martin Ostwald, Raphael Sealey,
Lene Rubinstein, Gabriel Herman, P.J. Rhodes, James Sickinger, Carlo Pelloso,
Paul Gowder and myself, have argued that by and large the Athenian legal system
conformed both to emic and to modern notions of the rule of law (and that the
institutions and rules described above, by-and-large, worked!), others, such as Robin
Osborne, Josiah Ober, David Cohen, Stephen Todd, Mathew Christ, and Adriaan
Lanni have faulted it for (allegedly) privileging notions of personal standing,
15 Cf. also Dem. 23.86, 218; 24.18, 59, 116, 188; [Dem.] 46.2. See Canevaro and Harris (2012: 117–119)
and Canevaro (2013: 145–150) for this rule.
16 This is found as a (reliable) document at Dem. 24.42, see Canevaro (2013: 121–127) (with previous
bibliography).




vengeance and extra-legal considerations of justice as opposed to lawfulness.18
Many of these treatments rely (much as many of the aggregated measures applied to
modern states do) on varying and incompatible definitions of the rule of law, and too
often, in my opinion, the criteria used to deny that Athens achieved the rule of law
would see most modern Western liberal societies fall short as well. Many of the
skeptics require of the Athenians standards of legal certainty that are not only
unrealistic for any society, but also theoretically problematic and potentially
undesirable, as they would conflict with other staples of the rule of law such as due
process and the procedural requirements that parties be allowed to argue anything
(concerning matters of fact as well as matters of law) that can be possibly argued.19
Apart from these brief remarks, it is not my aim in this article to argue that
Athenian practice fulfilled modern requirements of the rule of law—I have fought
this battle elsewhere, and I plan to fight it again in the future. For the purpose of this
article, it is enough for me to have shown that the Athenians (and, as we shall see,
the Greeks more widely) entertained notions of the rule of law, as found in their
political ideas, in their laws and institutions, that are recognizable to us, regardless
of whether the relevant institutions succeeded in achieving this ideal to an extent
that would satisfy us (and our aggregated measures). I believe that very few (if any)
ancient historians would deny this.20 My aim is rather to argue that this notion of the
rule of law was not just an ideal among many. In the world of the ancient Greek city
states, these notions became, from the Archaic period onwards, a normative ideal
that not only permeated legal and political thought and shaped the laws and
institutions of individual cities across a variety of constitutional arrangements, but
also by reference to which the different constitutional arrangements were judged.
This amounted to a veritable consensus, across an ecosystem of over 1500 city
states,21 that a well-governed city is one in which laws, not men, are sovereign. The
all-pervasiveness of this consensus is enough to make one question the accuracy of
Tamanaha’s statement that ‘[u]nanimity in support of the rule of law is a feat
unparalleled in history’. In the rest of this article I shall explore how a very similar
unanimity served as the baseline—the measure—of political and ideological debates
18 Harris (2006, 2013), Ostwald (1986), Sealey (1987), Rubinstein (2000, 2007), Rhodes (2004), Herman
(2006), Sickinger (2008), Gowder (2014), Canevaro (2013, 2015, 2018a, b), Pelloso (2018), Osborne
(1985), Ober (1989), Todd (1993), Cohen (1995), Christ (1998), Lanni (2006, 2016). For studies that
approach related problems from the point of view of New Institutional Economics, rational choice theory
and game theory, see Carugati (2014), Carugati, Hadfield and Weingast (2015), Carugati, Calvert and
Weingast (2016). Unlike Hansen and Ostwald, Harris does not believe that the concern with the rule of
law was an innovation of the fourth century BCE, to temper the ‘extreme’ democracy of the fifth, see in
particular Harris (2016).
19 See, on the problems of excessive requirements of legal certainty, MacCormick (2004) and Waldron
(2011). Forsdyke (2018) is the first study of the rule of law in Athens, to my knowledge, that deals more
systematically with issues of definition. She questions how much legal certainty can be found even in
modern systems, but still underestimates Athenian conformity, and overestimates the incompatibility
between the rule of law and legal uncertainty as determined by the existence of argument about the law.
20 For the ideal of the rule of law in Greek identity see e.g. Hall (1989: 198–200) and particularly Harris
(2006: 3–29).
21 See Hansen and Nielsen (2004) and Hansen (2006) for an invaluable inventory of the Archaic and
Classical Greek city states. After the conquest of Alexander city states spread even further around the
Mediterranean Sea and beyond, so the number of Greek city states must have been considerably higher.
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across constitutional divides in the world of the Greek city states. Section 2 focuses
on the Archaic Greek world, showing that recognisable ideas about the rule of law
informed the very earliest written statutes preserved from ancient Greece, and
discussing some of the poems of Solon to demonstrate that these took shape in the
context of explicit reflection on the rule of law. It will also show that the rule of law
was deployed in opposition to tyranny—rule of one man—and that its ideological
purchase was so strong that monocratic power itself, to be considered legitimate,
had to characterise itself as law-abiding. After establishing the place of the rule of
law as the universal foundation of political legitimacy in the Greek city states,
Section 3 discusses some important texts of the late fifth and fourth centuries BCE
in which the political legitimacy of different constitutional forms—chiefly
democracy and oligarchy—is debated in terms of whether these constitutions
conform to the shared ideal of the rule of law. It shows that a recognisable notion of
the rule of law was the measure according to which, in the fifth and fourth centuries
BCE, the legitimacy of particular constitutional arrangements was measured.
2 The Rule of Law and the Rule of Man in Archaic Greece
The first written law preserved on stone from the Greek world comes from the
Cretan city of Dreros, and is dated to the mid-seventh century BCE (Koerner 1993:
no. 90 = Nomima I no. 81).22 Its text is fragmentary, but the key provision can be
confidently read:
The polis has decided: when someone has been kosmos, within ten years the
same person is not to be kosmos again. But if he does become kosmos,
whenever he gives judgment, he himself is to owe a fine of twice the amount,
and he is to be without rights (to office?) as long as he lives, and whatever he
does as kosmos shall be void. And oath-swearers (are) the kosmos and the
damioi and the twenty of the polis. (tr. Gagarin-Perlman)
It is striking that this very early text of law is concerned with limiting the power and
the term of office of the highest official in the city, and implicitly states that political
power—even the highest official—is subject to the laws, which are sovereign and
must be respected by everyone, even by the rulers. The law also creates penalties for
the kosmos (the highest magistrate in Dreros) that breaks the law. The ideas
underpinning such provisions are already compatible with recognizable conception
of the primacy of the law over the decisions of man, and point to ideas of the rule of
law. This text is not an isolated case: another Cretan law, of the sixth century, from
Gortyn, provides that the same man cannot be kosmos again within three years,
gnomon within ten, and kosmos of the foreigners within five (Koerner 1993: no.
121 = ICret IV 14). The concern with limiting the power of political officials is an
overarching one in Archaic laws, which show a commitment to preventing the
arbitrary rule of man and the concentration of power in few hands. The Greeks
22 For an up-to-date discussion of this law, with previous bibliography, see now Gagarin (2008: 45–48),
Seelentag (2016: 139–163), Gagarin and Perlman (2016: 200–207).
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created laws that distributed powers and prerogatives among various boards of
officials, political bodies, and sections of the population: Solon distributed powers
and prerogatives among four property classes ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 7.3–4); a law from
Chios (Koerner 1993: no. 61) grants different duties and responsibilities to various
bodies and officials (cf. also Koerner 1993: no. 39, 74, 87). Archaic laws also
establish term-limits for magistrates (Koerner 1993: no. 77, 90, 121), impose
penalties for magistrates that do not uphold the law (Koerner 1993: no. 31, 41), and
often assign the enforcement of a rule not to an individual but to a board of officials
to avoid the concentration of power.23
These checks over the power of public officials are matched in Archaic laws by a
parallel concern with securing equality before the law for all citizens. A key
example of this concern is the Gortyn Code, the most extensive collection of laws
from any Greek polis, which starts with the provision: ‘If anyone wishes to contest
the status of a free man or a slave, he is not to seize him before a trial’. The
following provisions set heavy fines for whoever violates this rule, and create
procedures for bringing relevant disputes to trial. The law is immediately opposed to
the arbitrary will of men, and secures access to judicial proceedings to all. No one’s
status can be denied or contested without trial, and if it is contested, the defendant
has the right of access to the courts. The same principle is enshrined in the reforms
that, according to several sources, ‘founded’ the Athenian legal system: those of the
lawgiver Solon, enacted in the early sixth century BCE.24 The most important of
these reforms created the possibility for all members of the Athenian demos (the
plethos, in the words of [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 9.1) to appeal (ephesis) to a dikasterion (a
lawcourt), and introduced the generalized standing to sue—that is they ‘entitle the
volunteer to exact a penalty in the interest, in the name, and on behalf of the
offended party’.25 [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 9.1 mentions these reforms together with a ban
on loans on the security of the body, which outlawed enslavement of free Athenians
for debts. The possibility of appealing against a judicial decision (in most cases
taken by chieftains and magistrates) and have a case heard by a dikasterion (the
author of the Ath. Pol. tells us that the demos was in charge of that dikasterion) is
clearly aimed at restricting the arbitrary powers of individuals and securing equal
access to the law for all. And, from this point of view, it is also easy to see the
reason for the introduction of the possibility for a volunteer prosecutor to sue on
behalf of someone else: how else could an orphan’s rights be protected? How could
an old man sue his own son, who was failing to support him?
It is easy to identify in all these laws a common ideological stance, which affirms
the rule of law over the rule of man, creates general and reliable laws for all, as well
23 For these anti-tyrannical concerns in Archaic laws and the methods to avoid concentration of power
see Harris (2006: 3–39), with plenty of examples. For a general discussion of procedures to hold officials
accountable across the Greek world, see Fro¨hlich (2004).
24 See Rhodes (2006: 255–256) for these sources and their reliability. Even Mosse´ (1979: 433–434) and
Hansen (1989) agree that these reforms are probably Solonian, although Mosse´ mistrusts the possibility of
a dikasterion and supposes that the ephesis may have been to the Areopagus, while Hansen leaves open
the possibility that these reforms may also be fourth-century inventions.
25 Cf. Plut. Sol. 18.2-3, 6-7 and also Arist. Pol. 1273b 35–1274a5, 1274a15–18. For a recent discussion of
the institution of ephesis, with abundant discussion of previous scholarship, see Pelloso (2016).
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as rules and institutions to secure the neutrality of judicial proceedings and equality
before the law. Harris, in an important essay, identifies in these features the ‘spirit of
Greek laws’.26 And we are not reduced to extrapolate this ideological stance
exclusively from the extant fragments of Archaic Greek laws. Solon, the lawgiver,
was also a poet, some of whose fragments are extant. Although repetition,
expansion, re-orientation and re-performance surely affected the tradition of these
fragments,27 it is risky and ultimately unwarranted by the textual evidence to
consider them altogether later constructs.28 And, as argued forcefully by Martin on
the basis of a sensible use of ethnographical comparisons, ‘Solon’s poems are more
than “prime sources” for politics. They are politics, and politics as performed by the
most adept practitioners even today, whether in the first world or the third’.29
Solon is very clear about the role he envisions for himself as a lawgiver.30 He is
not a monarch, not a tyrant, not a ruler. He refuses such a position explicitly:
If I spared my homeland and did not grasp tyranny/and brute force, bringing
stain and disgrace on my reputation,/I am not ashamed. For I think that in this
way I shall be more able/to outstrip everyone. (fr. 32 West; tr. Gerber)
His position as lawgiver gave him the chance, instead of setting up laws for
everyone, to grasp power for himself, but he did not take it.31 The reasons for his
refusal to become an arbitrary ruler are clear—he refuses to accept that the arbitrary
power of one man can be reconciled with the good order of the city (eunomia).32 He
26 Harris (2006: 3–39).
27 On the effects of these processes in the Theognidean corpus see the essays in Figueira and Nagy
(1985).
28 This is the position of Lardinois (2006) and Stehle (2006), but see the careful discussion of these
aspects in Noussia-Fantuzzi (2010: 45–66).
29 Martin (2006), and in particular p. 158.
30 For a fuller discussion of these poems and of the ideology of the rule of law they delineate, see Harris
(2006: 10–14).
31 As Solon is in fact giving laws to the Athenians, he describes Athens before his intervention as
characterised by dysnomia, arbitrary power and abuse. It is he, with his laws, that establishes eunomia,
and therefore the rule of law. The chance he had to grasp power for himself was due to the dysnomia that
characterised Athens before his laws.
32 There has been much debate about the meaning of eunomia in an archaic context, and scholars usually
recognize that the reference is not specifically to written laws: in fact, if Arist. Pol. 1307a 1 and Strab.
8.4.10 are right when they claim that eunomia was the title of the poems of Tyartaeus in which he praised
the diarchy and the restoration of the order of Sparta as a guarantee of its stability, it is then clear that
there is no necessary connection between eunomia and written law. Solon after all gave the Athenians
thesmoi. And yet a connection clearly exists between eunomia and order, and even the etymological sense
of nemein, which refers to ‘(due) sharing’ implies that eunomia has to do with a good organization of
roles, behaviours, functions. And nomos clearly means in archaic texts ‘custom’, which has to do with
substantive rules of behaviour, with proper dealings with others (including the gods), and with respect of
one’s own and other people’s rights and prerogatives. This is why at Hom. Od. 17.487 and Hes. Op. 249–
255 the gods test the mortals’ hospitality and they find either their eunomie or their hybris. Eunomie has to
do with knowing one’s place, one’s duties, other people’s rights and prerogatives, and behaving
accordingly. Unsurprisingly its opposite is hybris, which has to do instead with overstepping one’s own
rights and therefore dishonouring other people. For the meaning of eunomia in Archaic texts, see e.g.
Ostwald (1969: 20–54), Mu¨lke (2002: 150–152), Noussia-Fantuzzi (2010: 258-261).
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is convinced, on the contrary, that the arbitrary power of one man can only reduce
the city into slavery (doulosyne). This is evident from another fragment:
From a cloud comes the force of snow and hail,/thunder from a flash of
lightning,/from powerful men a city’s destruction, and through ignorance the
masses fall/enslaved to a tyrant. If they raise a man too high, it’s not easy to
restrain him afterwards;/it is now that one should consider everything. (fr. 9
West; tr. Gerber)
Not only does Solon refuse to exploit his position as lawgiver to become a tyrant.
According to later legends about his legislative action, he also refused to combine
the roles of lawgiver, ruler and judge. According to both [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 7.2 and
Plut. Sol. 25, after Solon gave the Athenians their laws, he had them swear by the
gods not to change them for 100 years, and, as a statement that the function of the
lawgiver and that of administering the laws are not the same and to make sure that
the Athenians could not force him to change the laws himself, he left Athens for ten
years.33 It is far from sure that this story is reliable, and nevertheless it is an
important document for how the Athenians understood the action of their lawgiver,
and the kind of regime it instituted: not the rule of one man, but the rule of law,
independent from any individual who may have created the laws, and administered
by judges that are not the same as the legislators and the rulers. Very similar stories
are preserved for the lawgivers of other city states, which is evidence that this
understanding of the foundational role of the lawgiver in instituting the rule of law,
as opposed to the arbitrary rule of man, was a widespread feature of the Greeks’
understanding of their political systems.34
Another Solonian poem (fr. 36 West) is even more explicit in defining what
his legislative activity implied—what were its purposes and presuppositions.
This poem has given rise to plenty of scholarly debate, and it is not necessary
for our purposes here to discuss all the interpretative problems, let alone to solve
them.35 In this poem, Solon defends his legislative action against criticism, and
the argument starts from the defence of the freedom of the Athenians against
enslavement (douleia), and turns then to the chief instrument to secure their
freedom: enacting laws for everyone. It is a powerful statement of the centrality
of equality before the law, and of the rule of law, as the main barrier to arbitrary
power and political subjection. The poem opens with a rhetorical question to
Solon’s critics: ‘Before achieving what of the goals for which I brought the
demos together did I stop?’36 A vindication of his achievements follows. His
first claim is to have freed Dark Earth, the mighty mother of the Olympian gods,
33 See Harris (2006: 11–13) and Westbrook (2000: 42): ‘legislation became detached from the legislator’.
Cf. also Naiden (2013).
34 For a thorough discussion of the traditions of the lawgivers see Ho¨lkeskamp (1999: 28–59).
35 See Noussia-Fantuzzi (2010: 455–87) for a detailed commentary and previous scholarship.
36 At least, the portion we have opens with this question, because the particle de shows that this can be
the beginning of the poem only if it was part of a sympotic chain, cf. Noussia-Fantuzzi (2010: 460). Some
scholars take this question to be an admission of partial failure. But see Jaeger (1945: 452 n. 59), Blaise
(1995: 27) and Noussia-Fantuzzi (2010: 461–462).
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previously enslaved, removing the horoi (boundary markers) that burdened it.37
After this, Solon enters into detail. Many Athenians were reduced to slavery,
sold abroad or working in Attica, and many were forced to flee abroad because
of necessity. Solon restored them to their rightful status, and made it secure. At
ll. 18–20 Solon explains how he achieved this: he wrote laws (thesmous) that
defined the rights, prerogatives, duties, timai of all citizens, the agathoi and the
kakoi alike. Solon claims to have legislated for everyone, and this is a powerful
statement of the importance of equality before the law. The argument is that an
ordered society (eunomia) is one in which one is secure in his position and will
be treated, and will receive justice, appropriately and in accordance with his
rights and his status. The last few lines of the poem, ll. 20–27, elaborate on the
way in which Solon has managed not to side with anyone, despite the pressures,
and therefore to set an order in which everyone is provided for. He nicely
summarizes the difficulty of his task with a metaphor: he was like a wolf among
a pack of dogs.
For Solon, then, the arbitrary rule of man brings disorder (dysnomia) and
slavery (douleia), and the alternative is the rule of law. This order, as we have
seen from the evidence of Archaic statutes, is guaranteed by equality before the
law for officials and citizens alike, and by institutional devices to avoid the
concentration of power. And, accordingly, the lawgiver himself needs to step
aside, because the function of giving laws to the city cannot be performed by the
same person who then administers the laws, and runs the city more widely.
While the rule of law is explicitly conceived and predicated in opposition to the
arbitrary rule of man, the relation between an understanding of the rule of man
as problematic and the commitment to the rule of law is not straightforward: the
first does not precede the second, but they rather reinforce each other. In fact,
the ideology of the rule of law affirmed itself across the world of the Greek
poleis to the extent that perfectly traditional forms of monarchical rule, that are
known very well from the Homeric poems, and are there portrayed as good and
legitimate, came to be understood as arbitrary, illegitimate, and to be associated
with lawlessness.38
The Greeks even found a new word to indicate those traditional forms of
monarchical rule (and to dissociate their contemporary manifestations
from Homeric forms of basileia): tyrannos.39 This was a foreign word,
which was used to characterize monarchical rule as quintessentially
37 On the meaning of this expression see Harris (1997).
38 On basileia in Homer and the development of monarchical rule in the Archaic period, see (for
important recent contributions, with previous scholarship) e.g. van Wees (1992: 281–298), Anderson
(2005), Mitchell (2013: 23–55), Luraghi (2013), Hall (2014: 126–153), Cairns (2015). Taylor (2017)
makes the important case that the forms of monarchical power that are later understood as tyrannical are
not qualitatively different from previous legitimate forms of basileia. What changes is the ideological
consensus about what is legitimate: with the rise of the ideology of the rule of law (and its expression in
written statutes), these monarchical forms become unacceptable, and are cast as lawless and contrary to
the rule of law.
39 The traditional word basileus was on the other hand normalised and used to indicate public officials




un-Greek.40 Monarchical rule (tyranny) came to be associated with arbitrary
rule—with absolute authority exercised out of whim, without restraint, and
outside the control of the laws. The sources provide countless stories about
the misdeeds of the tyrants: we read of Phalaris, the tyrant of Acragas in
Sicily, who had the habit of roasting alive his opponents in a hollow bronze
bull (the first source is Pind. Pyth. 1.95-6); we read of Cypselus of Corinth,
who tried to have 300 Corcyrean aristocrats castrated as eunuchs in Sardi,
who murdered his wife and had sexual intercourse with her dead body, who
gathered the women of Corinth together and stripped them naked, and
exterminated his rivals (Hdt. 3.50; 5.92). This understanding of tyranny as a
form of personal rule that steps out of the rule of law and becomes fully
arbitrary and uncontrolled—the kind of power that Archaic statutes tried to
prevent—is encapsulated in Aristotle’s much later account of the rise of tyranny:
‘earlier tyrannies were due to basileis exceeding the traditional limitations and
aspiring to a more despotic form of rule… Thus Pheidon in the case of Argos
and others became tyrants when they were already basileis.’ (Arist. Pol.
1410b14-28).
Thus, the very understanding of sole-rulership as arbitrary and illegitimate was
a development contemporary and connected with the affirmation of the rule of
law ideology: traditional monarchical forms were recast within this shared
framework and found wanting, and isolated as un-Greek—‘[t]he rule of law
[became the] accepted measure […] of government legitimacy’. And the strength
of this ideological constraint was such that even tyrants, in order to legitimate
themselves, came to portrait themselves as guarantors of justice and of the rule of
law. This is clear in the positive traditions about particular tyrants, which stress
that they were law-abiding and that they fought to enforce the rule of law against
aristocrats that attempted to overthrow it. We learn from Herodotus, for instance,
that an oracle stated that Cypselus would set Corinth on a path of justice (Hdt.
5.92). The family of the the Orthagorids of Sicyon were also said to have ‘treated
their subjects moderately and in many respects enslaved themselves to the laws’
(Arist. Pol. 1315b 16). Peisistratus, the tyrant that in the sixth century BCE seized
control of Athens, was known to have administered everything ‘according to the
laws’, to have created legal institutions such as travelling judges to bring the rule
of law also in the most remote villages of Attica, and to have subjected himself to
trial when accused with a homicide charge ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 16.8). His figure is
the prototype of the law-abiding tyrant, whose legitimation comes from
respecting and enforcing the rule of law. To such an extent was the ideology
of the rule of law the chief source of legitimation for any government in a Greek
city, that even sole rulers were forced to defend the legitimacy of their rule within
this framework.41
40 Andrewes (1956: 22), and Lewis (2009: 7) believe that the word tyrannos is of Lydian origin. Austin
(1990: 289) argues that the word came from Asia Minor. Parker (1998: 145–149) finds Hittite and Old
Testament terms for rulers and judges that are similar to tyrannos.
41 Similar strategies used by sole rulers are found in later sources. For instance, in Arrianus’ Anabasis
(7.9.2-3), Alexander, in his famous speech at Opis of 324 BCE, states that his father Philip made the
Macedonians into a community ruled by law.
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3 The Rule of Law as a Standard of Legitimacy: Democracy Versus
Oligarchy
The previous section has shown that the Greeks shared from the Archaic period
onwards a constitutional identity based on the ideal of the rule of law as opposed to
the rule of man (characterized as tyranny). This identity was enshrined in a variety
of institutional arrangements that secured the accountability of officials that had to
act within the limits of the law, fought concentration of power and its potential
consequences for the primacy of the law, attempted to create legal certainty, and
ensured (at least notionally) equality before the law and due process. These ideals
and institutions were shared across the world of the Greek city states, and were
conceptualized as distinctively Greek, as opposed to the monarchical and autocratic
world of the barbarians. This opposition formed the ideological backbone of the
Greek resistance to the Persians at the time of the Persian Wars. The Spartan exile
Demaratus, as narrated by Herodotus, explains to Xerxes, the Persian king, the
difference between Greeks and Persians precisely in these terms. The courage of the
Greeks is founded on their intelligence and on the force of law (Hdt. 7.103), he
explains, and then remarks on the Spartans in particular:
The point is that although [the Spartans are] free, they’re not entirely free:
their master is the law, and they’re far more afraid of this than your men are of
you. At any rate, they do whatever the law commands, and its command never
changes: it is that they should not turn tail in battle no matter how many men
are ranged against them, but should maintain their positions and either win or
die. (Hdt. 7.104; tr. Waterfield)
Within the framework of this opposition between Greek city states characterized by
the rule of law and autocratic barbarians, constitutional differences between Greek
cities, as to how wide the citizenship franchise and how equally spread political
power were, were underplayed. This progressively changed in the years following
the Greek victory in the Persian Wars, when the Greek world slowly broke down
into two areas of influence, that of Sparta and that of Athens, engaged repeatedly in
warfare against each other.42 In Sparta, the regime was unquestionably an oligarchy,
characterized by political power confined in the hands of a small minority, whereas
in Athens all freeborn Athenians were politically equal and had equal access to
political decision making and political offices.43 As this opposition intensified, it
was accompanied by a heated ideological battle about the desirability of the
different constitutional arrangements that, by the later fifth century, brought into
sharp focus no longer the common features of the Greek political systems, but the
differences between them. While the rule of law was a shared ideological (and
42 The classic account of the fifty years between the Persian Wars and the outbreak of the Peloponnesian
War between Athens (and allies) and Sparta (and allies) is the Pentekontaetia in book 1 of Thucydides
(1.89-117). For an accessible and rather comprehensive account of the development of this period see
Rhodes (2010: 14–76 and 8) (with further bibliography).
43 For the oligarchic nature of Spartan decision making see de Ste Croix (1972: 124–51), Kennell (2010:
93–114), and now Esu (2018) with abundant previous bibliography. For economic, social and political
inequality in Sparta, also within the Spartiates, see the classic account of Hodkinson (2000).
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institutional) feature of the Greek city states, and therefore focusing on it was
functional to stressing their similarities and creating a common Greek political
identity, stressing the differences between oligarchy and democracy was functional
to sharpening the ideological divide between Athens and Sparta. But, as we shall see
in this section by analysing some important texts, ideological concerns with rule of
law did not for this reason become less important. On the contrary, ‘unanimity in
support of the rule of law’ became the measure of the ideological battle between
oligarchy and democracy. ‘The rule of law [was the] accepted measure […] of
government legitimacy’, and oligarchy and democracy were celebrated and
criticized inasmuch as they were argued to be compatible or incompatible with
the rule of law, to foster or hamper the rule of law as opposed to the rule of man.44
The first text to be discussed is the Politeia of the Athenians attributed in
antiquity to Xenophon, but recognized by scholars as written before 424 BCE,
probably in the late 430s, and as the work of a different author. The political outlook
of this author is encapsulated by the nickname with which scholars refer to him: the
‘Old Oligarch’.45 This Politeia of the Athenians, normally translated as ‘Consti-
tution’, is not in fact a constitution in the modern sense—the term refers rather to
the political organization and the ways of communal life of a particular
community.46 This text is emblematic of the context of the struggle (ideological,
political and military) between Sparta and Athens, and provides a (very partial)
formulation of the ideological choices before the Greeks (and the Athenians) at this
time, conceptualized as an alternative between the government of the ‘best men’ and
that of the ‘worst men’. Within this framework, the Old Oligarch introduces the
word demokratia as a negative term, interpreting the term demos not as referring to
the people as a whole, but rather to ‘the lower classes’, ‘the mob’, as opposed to the
leaders of the community, characterized as morally, physically and intellectually
superior with terms such as agathoi, aristoi, chrestoi.47 The members of the demos,
44 These formulations are (modified) from Tamanaha (2004: 3), as they apply equally well to the ancient
Greek world.
45 For an accessible introduction to, and English translation of, the Old Oligarch see Marr and Rhodes
(2008). For important recent studies, see e.g. Hornblower (2000), Faraguna (2011).
46 The term politeia (Antiph. 3.2.1; Thuc. 2.37; Pl. Resp. 8.562a; Aeschin. 1.5; Arist. Pol. 3.1279a) is
defined by Plato as ‘the institution of the magistracies and of the magistrates’, and by Aristotle as ‘a kind
of organisation of those that live in the city’ (Arist. Pol. 1274b34). It can be used with various meanings,
and it indicates mainly the community of citizens and their rights and prerogatives (e.g. Hdt. 9.34.1; Thuc.
6.104.2, [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 54.3) or the constitutional and social arrangement of a city state (e.g. Thuc.
2.37.2, Dem. 18.87, 19.184). See in general Bordes (1982), Schofield (2006: 35–50), Harte and Lane
(2013: 1–12 and passim).
47 Cf. Gomme (1956: 107–108): ‘demokratia can mean either simply majority rule in a state where all
citizens have the vote… or the consistent domination of the state by the masses’. Demos, within the word
demokratia, could be used with both the meaning of the people in its entirety, and with that of the
‘masses’. There is also much debate on the meaning of the term kratos, which for some refers to a violent
and arrogant form of power, while, for instance, Ober (2008a, b) makes the argument that it simply meant
in the context of the word demokratia, ‘capacity to do things’. Raaflaub (1983: 517–544), Hansen (2006)
and Ober (1989) e.g. believe that the meaning ‘rule of the majority’ or ‘rule of the mob’ were
intentionally pejorative diminutions. Scholars such as Sealey (1974: 282, 292–295) and Canfora (2006:
8), on the other hand, believe that the pejorative meaning was the original one, and that the term
demokratia was then ‘rescued’ by the Athenians to mark, with a positive sense, their regime.
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in this opposition, are characterized as morally, physically and intellectually
inferior, with terms such as kakoi or poneroi.48 [Xen.] Ath. Pol. 1.5-9 is emblematic
of this argumentative scheme, and shows that this opposition is construed in terms
of adherence (or otherwise) to the rule of law. The passage uses the word
demokratia negatively, from the point of view of the oligarchic, pro-Sparta block, as
an insult to the Athenian constitutional model. But the basic presuppositions of the
discussion are familiar, and rely on a shared understanding of the rule of law. The
‘best men’ are naturally more suited to fostering justice and opposing injustice
(adikia), whereas the people are characterised by disorder (ataxia) and lawlessness.
Good government under good laws (eunomia, the same ideal enunciated by Solon,
and typical of Athens, Sparta and any other Greek polis) is described by the Old
Oligarch as leading naturally to the subjection (douleuein: lit. enslavement) of the
people.49 Where the people are free and strong, the regime is one of kakonomia—
bad government characterised by bad laws—the opposite of the rule of law. To
create and preserve eunomia, it is necessary that only the more capable are allowed
to make the laws (tous nomous tithentas), and that the ‘worst’ are controlled by the
‘best’, and are not allowed to be members of the Council or speak in the Assembly.
According to the Old Oligarch, eunomia is necessarily characterized by the
subjection (or, actually, enslavement, douleia) of the people.50 Despite the novel
ideological aim of the Old Oligarch’s discussion—to denigrate demokratia—the
basic presuppositions are still those familiar from Solon: the positive model is still
eunomia (a concept that, as we have seen, implies notions of the rule of law), and its
contrary is kakonomia, a variant of anomia or dysnomia, as lawlessness. The
ideological move of the Old Oligarch is to exclude demokratia from the horizon of
the constitutional forms compatible with eunomia, and to characterize it as a form of
lawless arbitrary power (similar in fact to tyranny). In demokratia, according to the
Old Oligarch, we do not find the rule of law, but that of men—of the ‘worst’.
In the new fifth-century context of the Greek world divided along political,
military and constitutional lines, the eunomia model is no longer used to unite the
Greeks (as it did against the Persians), but it is no less central. It is ‘the accepted
measure […] of government legitimacy’, and as such it is used as the shared
baseline for criticism across the constitutional divide. It is the foundation of
oligarchic criticism of Athens, whose regime is attacked as arbitrary because the
people have more authority than the laws. This line of criticism becomes standard,
and is still what we find, in less polemical but no less stark terms, in Aristotle a
century later. In the Politics (1298b13–15) Aristotle states that ‘the democracy
which is most considered to be democracy nowadays is one in which the demos is
master over the laws—namely an extreme democracy’ (trans. Strauss). Aristotle had
previously explained that the main feature of extreme democracy is that the plethos
48 For the use of these terms, and the ethical and political judgement attached to them, see in particular
the synthesis of Marr and Rhodes (2008: 24-6 and 171-2), as well as the more detailed discussions in
Cagnetta et al. (1977), Faraguna (2011: 85–87).
49 This is probably the first passage in which we find eunomia used in the full Classical sense, with
reference to nomos as ‘positive law’, see Ostwald (1969, pp. 82–85 e 94–95) and Faraguna (2011: 89).
50 For this matching of eunomia and douleia see Faraguna (2011: 89), and for its similarity with
Callicles’ positions in Plato’s Gorgias (483c–484c, 490a–492c) see Heftner (2003: 11–13).
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(the masses) and not the nomos is sovereign, and this translates into a situation in
which the psephismata (decrees/orders passed by the people in the Assembly) and
not the laws are sovereign (1292a1–7).51 And the Aristotelian Atheniaon Politeia
(41) characterizes the final phase of Athenian democracy as an extreme democracy
in which the people, and not the law, are sovereign, in very similar terms:
The eleventh [and final phase of the Athenian democracy, the fourth-century
one] was the one which came into being after the return of the exiles from
Phyle and the Piraeus, from which date it continued to exist until it reached its
present form, all the time granting even more power to the people. For the
people has placed itself in control of everything and administers everything
through its decrees and its courts, in which the people holds the power.
On the one hand, the ideology of the rule of law becomes the foundation of the
criticism of democracy. On the other, the defence of democracy is not founded on a
refusal of this ideology, but rather is construed by stressing the compatibility of
democracy with the rule of law, and denying that oligarchic constitutional forms are
in fact compatible with the rule of law. Pericles’ Funeral Speech for the first year of
the Peloponnesian War, as reported by Thucydides, is a key witness of this
ideological operation, from the same period as the Politeia of the Athenians by the
Old Oligarch.52 This text has often been read as an uncontroversial celebration of
democracy, but it is in fact a very polemical text.53 Its aim is to rescue demokratia
from Spartan and oligarchic criticism that denies its compatibility with the rule of
law, and to argue that demokratia is in fact eminently compatible with the rule of
law, casting doubts at the same time on Sparta’s own adherence to that shared
model.54 This ideological move, of which this text must have been only one
example among many, eventually won the day (even as Athens ended up losing the
war), and by the end of the fourth century BCE most Greek poleis represented
themselves as demokratiai, in accordance with a constitutional model understood as
the combination of the rule of law and the absence of citizenship franchises.55
51 Note that the rule of law is not in Aristotle only the measure of the legitimacy of democracy, but of any
regime: ‘where the laws do not rule, there is no constitution’ (1292a32). For a thorough discussion of
these passages (and in general of book IV of the Politics) see Besso et al. (2014), with previous
bibliography.
52 See in particular Harris (2006: 29–39) for the polarity built in this speech between the Athenians and
the Spartans, and Hussey (1985: 123–129) for the view of Spartan values found in the speech. On the
genre of the funeral speech see in general Loraux (1986), and, as a selection of fairly recent discussions,
Ziolkowski (1981), Thomas (1989: 196-237), Parker (1996: 131–141), Mills (1997: 58–78), Herrman
(2009: 3–26), Low (2010), Shear (2013). The literature on Pericles’ speech is immense, but see at least
Hornblower (1987: 45–65) (with discussion of previous treatments), Harris (2006: 29–39), Bosworth
(2000). Longo (2000) is a good commentary of the speech, with an extensive bibliography at pp. 101–11.
For a good discussion of what we can reconstruct of Pericles the orator see Azoulay (2014: 40–51).
53 See Canfora (2006: 7–35) and Hansen (2008) for a recent example of the diatribes to which this speech
can give rise, well beyond Classical scholarship.
54 See Harris (2006) for a reading of the speech in these terms.
55 See for this ‘great convergence’ towards demokratia Ma (2017), as well as the syntheses of the debate
in Hamon (2009) and Mann (2012).
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I shall concentrate here on one particular passage of Pericles’ speech, which sets
this ideological operation in stark relief, and highlights its nuances (Thuc. 2.37).
Our form of government (politeia) does not emulate the laws (nomoi) of our
neighbours: we are an example to others, rather than an imitation of them. Its
name is democracy (demokratia) because the administration is in the hands of
the many, not of the few. In private disputes they guarantee equal treatment to
all according to the laws (nomoi). In public matters, if one has acquired
renown in some field, we do not select for office from a small number of
citizens, but according to the value of each citizen; nor is poverty, for the
obscurity of reputation that derives from it, a barrier to office for those that
have some good to offer to the city. We are open and free in the conduct of our
public affairs and in the uncensorious way we observe the habits of each
other’s daily lives: we are not angry with our neighbour if he indulges his own
pleasure, nor do we put on the disapproving look which falls short of
punishment but can still hurt. We are tolerant in our private dealings with one
another, but in all public matters we abide by the law: it is fear above all which
keeps us obedient to the authorities of the day and to the laws, especially those
laws established for the protection of the injured and those unwritten laws
whose contravention brings acknowledged disgrace. (Thuc. 2.37; trans.
modified from Hammond)
The first point to note is that the celebration of Athens’ regime, even in a paragraph
that is often read as the vindication of democracy, does not start from the demos, but
rather from the laws. It is the excellence of the laws that is cause of the excellence of
the city. It is instrumental, in the context of criticisms of democracy such as those of
the Old Oligarch, that characterise democracy as incompatible with the rule of law
and subject to the rule of man, to start the defence of Athens’ constitution explicitly
with its laws, to mark their primacy. Democracy comes into play only after this
statement—Pericles states explicitly that this politeia, as defined by the laws, is a
demokratia. It is a demokratia because the running of the polis is in the hands of the
many, not of the few.56 And Sparta is the implicit polemic target here, because in
Sparta the running of the polis is in the hands of the few. Pericles therefore
characterises demokratia not as a regime in which the demos has absolute
sovereignty, even over the laws, but rather as regime founded on the laws, and that
by virtue of these laws gives the many the power the run the city. This vindication of
democracy is framed by the laws, which not only precede it, but also follow it: right
after this statement, Pericles goes back to the laws and states that the laws guarantee
equal treatment to all (and the expression kata tous nomous is a reference to the
Judicial Oath, and found very often in Athenian decrees). Thus, Pericles affirms the
56 For the correct understanding of this sentence, see Harris (2006: 29–41) and Hansen (2008), pace e.g.
Loraux (1986: 183), Ostwald (1986: 183), Rusten (1989: 145). Notice that when Pericles states that
Athens is a democracy because the power is in the hands of the majority and not of the few, he is not
referring to majority decision making—the decision of the 50% plus one is binding for all—but to the
participation of the majority in deliberation. The polemical target is Sparta as an oligarchy, and what
distinguishes Sparta from Athens is not that in Sparta the decision of the 50% minus one is binding (that
would be absurd), but rather that only a minority has access to deliberation.
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compatibility of democracy with the rule of law by framing the defence of
democracy in-between statements of the supremacy of the law over the power of
man, and of the equality before the law granted in Athens to all citizens. In affirming
that the democratic regime of Athens abides by the rule of law, Pericles sticks to the
typical language of isonomia, and states that the sovereignty of the demos (of the
many) in matters of administration does not equate to any form of rule of man—it is
inscribed within the rule of law.
The openness of the Athenian regime is then vindicated also in the context of the
selection of officials, which is open to all and performed on the basis of merit alone.
The polemical target is once again the Spartan model, and Pericles’ argument is that
it is possible to retain the rule of law without reducing the poor to a condition of
subjugation that resembles enslavements (the douleia mentioned by the Old
Oligarch). This is democracy’s contribution to (and qualification of) wide-spread
notions of the rule of law. And it is no chance that the next few sentences of this
passage are in fact concerned with freedom. The freedom of the demos is defined
not as freedom to do whatever they wish, without rules or restraint (as argued by the
Old Oligarch), but rather has to do with fear of the laws, ‘which keeps us obedient to
the authorities of the day and to the laws’.
This demokratia is therefore conceptually vindicated and justified on the basis of
the same notion which were used to criticise it: the rule of law. It affirms its
compatibility with, and adherence to, this ideal, against the criticism of its
detractors. The ‘debate’ between the Old Olgarch and the Thucydidean Pericles is
indeed evidence that ‘[t]he rule of law [was the] accepted measure […] of
government legitimacy’. And, in the century following this ideological confronta-
tion, the Athenians stuck to this understanding of their constitutions as founded on
the rule of law, with the laws of the city enabling democracy. Little more than thirty
years after Pericles’ speech, Lysias, in another funeral speech (Lys. 2.19), argued
that it is typical of wild beasts to attempt to gain power one over the other, through
violence, whereas men define what is just through the laws, persuade one another
through reason, and live their lives submitting to the rule of law and to reason.57 The
same notion of the primacy of the law is found in the Ephebic oath, discussed above.
And this submission to the rule of law as opposed to that of man is understood as the
only guarantee of democracy, and as its foundation. It also comes to be understood
as what distinguishes democracy from other regimes, which are described in turn as
incompatible with the rule of law (with a move that is the reversal of what the Old
Oligarch, and the fifth-century oligarchs more generally, attempted). Aeschines’
speech Against Ctesiphon (3.6) is a prime example of this line of argument:
You are well aware, men of Athens, that there are three kinds of constitution in
the whole world, dictatorship (tyrannis), oligarchy, and democracy, and
dictatorships and oligarchies are governed by the temperament of those in
power, whereas democratic cities are governed by the established laws. None
of you should fail to note, in fact everyone should be clear in his mind, that
when he enters the courtroom to judge an indictment for illegality, he is about
57 Cf. Harris (2013: 3).
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to give a verdict that day on his own right to free speech. This is why the
legislator made this the first clause in the judges’ oath: “I shall vote according
to the laws”. He was well aware that when the laws are protected for the city,
the democracy, too, is preserved. (Aeschin. 3.6; trans. modified from Carey).
Oligarchy and tyranny are characterized as regimes founded on the rule of man, not
on that of law. Democracy is on the other hand founded on the rule of law, and is
made possible by the rule of law. A passage of another speech of Aeschines, the
Against Timarchus (1.4-5), makes the same point, with very similar words, but
making the implications of the rule of law even clearer:
It is agreed that there are three kinds of constitution in the whole world,
dictatorship (tyrannis), oligarchy, and democracy, and dictatorships and
oligarchies are governed by the temperament of those in power, but
democratic cities are governed by the established laws. You are aware, men
of Athens, that in a democracy the persons of citizens and the constitution are
protected by the laws, while dictators and oligarchs are protected by distrust
and armed guards. Oligarchs and all who run a constitution based on
inequality must be on guard against people who attempt to overthrow the
constitution by force; but you, and all who have a constitution based on
equality and law, must watch out for people whose words and way of life
contravene the laws. For your real strength is when you are ruled by law and
are not subverted by men who break them. (Aeschin. 1.4-5; trans. Carey)
Democracy is here represented as the only political constitution compatible with the
rule of law, and is legitimised by virtue of this compatibility. The rule of law is still
the chief normative ideal—the one that gives legitimacy to political systems. Thus,
as democracy is characterised as compatible with the rule of law, oligarchy and
monarchical rule are painted as the epitome of the arbitrary rule of man, justified by
distrust and force. At both ends of this debate on constitutional forms, the baseline
that guarantees mutual understanding, and justifies all arguments, in whatever
direction, is still the shared ideal of the rule of law. Much like in the modern world
—in our debates across political divides and in the aggregate measures to assess the
quality of different political systems, in the world of the Greek poleis ‘[t]he rule of
law is [the] accepted measure […] of government legitimacy’.
4 Conclusions
In the Greek city states, the rule of law, in its earliest manifestations, was connected
to the refusal of monarchical authority—of the arbitrary power of one man. This
article shows that the alternative to the rule of one man was soon conceptualised in
terms of limitations to the authority of those in power through fixed rules—written
laws—that defined precisely their prerogatives, made them accountable for any
overstepping of such prerogatives, and avoided concentration of power. Evidence
for such measures is found across the world of the Greek city states. But the
evidence shows us more than ad hoc devices to limit the concentration of power: it
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shows us that these laws came to be understood as the embodiment of a shared
ideology that affirmed, against the rule of man, the rule of law, understood first and
foremost as the superiority of law over any form of political power, which was to be
subjected to the law if the citizens of a city wanted to remain free, and not be
enslaved (douleia is used in our sources both metaphorically, to refer to extreme
political subjection, and literally).
This basic understanding had deeper consequences in how the Greeks concep-
tualised their legal and political systems. From a legal point of view, the superiority
of the law as the key instrument to avoid the enslavement of the citizens translated
into a concern with equality before the law and with legal formality, which is
particularly evident in Athens, but is found across the Greek world. From a political
point of view, the shared commitment to the rule of law soon became a key trait of
Greek identity, and therefore the ultimate measure of the legitimacy of any political
regime. During the Persian Wars, the rule of law became the mark of Greek
exceptionalism vis-à-vis the autocratic political forms of the Persian Empire, and
bound together the Greeks in their struggle. In doing so, it served to obscure
significant constitutional differences, which came to the fore in the two centuries
after the Persian Wars. And yet—I have argued in this article—ideological
positioning and debate between democratic and oligarchic constitutional forms did
not replace the centrality of the rule of law. On the contrary, the rule of law affirmed
itself even further as the highest (and widely-shared) political ideal, the baseline for
the discussion, and ultimately the measure of the political legitimacy of any regime.
This extended process, which took place in, and affected, a world of over 1500
city states over several centuries and across a huge geographical stretch, is a
significant precedent for the modern ‘global endorsement’ of the rule of law as the
chief political ideal of our age. It is a significant case study—possibly the most
significant case study—of a historical process fundamentally independent from that
which has led to the affirmation of the modern ideology of the rule of law, and yet
one which led to the formation of, and to wide consensus on, a concept of the rule of
law which is recognisable to us, and was driven by concerns and aims to a large
extent analogous to ours.
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